Antineutrino Monitoring of Thorium Reactors

Abstract

Various groups have demonstrated that antineutrino monitoring can be successful in assessing the plutonium content in water-cooled nuclear reactors for nonproliferation applications. New reactor designs and concepts incorporate nontraditional fuels types and chemistry. Understanding how these properties affect the antineutrino emission from a reactor can extend the applicability of antineutrino monitoring. Thorium molten salt reactors (MSR) breed U-233, that if diverted constitute a direct use material as defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The antineutrino spectrum from the fission of U-233 has been estimated for the first time, and the feasibility of detecting the diversion of 8 kg of U-233, within a 30 day timeliness goal has been evaluated. The antineutrino emission from a thorium reactor operating under normal conditions is compared to a diversion scenario by evaluating the daily antineutrino count rate and the energy spectrum of the detected antineutrinos at a 25 meter standoff. It was found that the diversion of a significant quantity of U-233 could not be detected within the current IAEA timeliness detection goal using either tests. A rate-time based analysis exceeded the timeliness goal by 23 days, while a spectral based analysis exceeds this goal by 31 days.

8 pages, 7 figures