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papers

Publications (18)

cs.LO2011

A Tight Lower Bound for Streett Complementation

Yang Cai, Ting Zhang

cs.LO2012

Can Nondeterminism Help Complementation?

Yang Cai, Ting Zhang

cs.GT2015

On the Economic Efficiency of the Combinatorial Clock Auction

Nicolas Bousquet, Yang Cai, Christoph Hunkenschröder +1

cs.GT2013

Designing Markets for Daily Deals

Yang Cai, Mohammad Mahdian, Aranyak Mehta +1

cs.GT2017

Approximating Gains from Trade in Two-sided Markets via Simple Mechanisms

Johannes Brustle, Yang Cai, Fa Wu +1

cs.LO2011

Tight Upper Bounds for Streett and Parity Complementation

Yang Cai, Ting Zhang

cs.GT2013

Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations

Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg

cs.GT2014

Extreme-Value Theorems for Optimal Multidimensional Pricing

Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis

stat.ML2015

Optimum Statistical Estimation with Strategic Data Sources

Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, Christos H. Papadimitriou

cs.GT2013

Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design becomes Algorithm Design

Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg

cs.GT2018

A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design

Yang Cai, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg

cs.GT2012

Simple and Nearly Optimal Multi-Item Auctions

Yang Cai, Zhiyi Huang

cs.GT2017

A Constructive Approach to Reduced-Form Auctions with Applications to Multi-Item Mechanism Design

Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg

cs.LG2018

Learning Safe Policies with Expert Guidance

Jessie Huang, Fa Wu, Doina Precup +1

cs.GT2015

Welfare and Rationality Guarantees for the Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending Auction

Nicolas Bousquet, Yang Cai, Adrian Vetta

cs.GT2012

Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization

Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg

cs.GT2018

The Best of Both Worlds: Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms with a Guarantee on the Expected Gains-From-Trade

Moshe Babaioff, Yang Cai, Yannai A. Gonczarowski +1

cs.GT2017

Learning Multi-item Auctions with (or without) Samples

Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis