papers
Publications (15)
cs.GT2019
The Vickrey Auction with a Single Duplicate Bidder Approximates the Optimal Revenue
Hu Fu, Christopher Liaw, Sikander Randhawa
cs.GT2015
Randomization beats Second Price as a Prior-Independent Auction
Hu Fu, Nicole Immolica, Brendan Lucier +1
cs.GT2012
Simultaneous Auctions are (almost) Efficient
Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin +1
cs.GT2013
Cost-Recovering Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design
Hu Fu, Brendan Lucier, Balasubramanian Sivan +1
cs.GT2013
Prior-independent Auctions for Risk-averse Agents
Hu Fu, Jason Hartline, Darrell Hoy
cs.GT2014
Approximate Revenue Maximization in Interdependent Value Settings
Shuchi Chawla, Hu Fu, Anna Karlin
cs.GT2014
The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions
Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah +1
cs.GT2009
Amplified Hardness of Approximation for VCG-Based Mechanisms
Shaddin Dughmi, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg
cs.CC2013
Improved Lower Bounds for Testing Triangle-freeness in Boolean Functions via Fast Matrix Multiplication
Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg
cs.GT2014
Optimal Auctions for Correlated Buyers with Sampling
Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason Hartline +1
cs.GT2015
On the Complexity of Computing an Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions
Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg
cs.GT2010
Truthfulness via Proxies
Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg
cs.GT2017
The Value of Information Concealment
Hu Fu, Chris Liaw, Pinyan Lu +1
cs.GT2012
Bayesian Optimal Auctions via Multi- to Single-agent Reduction
Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah +2
cs.GT2010
Optimal Auctions with Correlated Bidders are Easy
Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg